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Abstract 
In this paper, we formulate a qualitative "lin­
ear" utility theory for lotteries in which un­
certainty is expressed qualitatively using a 
Spohnian disbelief function. We argue that 
a rational decision maker facing an uncertain 
decision problem in which the uncertainty is 
expressed qualitatively should behave so as 
to maximize "qualitative expected utility." 
Our axiomatization of the qualitative util­
ity is similar to the axiomatization developed 
by von Neumann and Morgenstern for prob­
abilistic lotteries. We compare our results 
with other recent results in qualitative de­
cision making. 
1 Introduction 
The main goal of this paper is to construct a lin­
ear utility theory for lotteries in which uncertainty is 
described by epistemic beliefs as described by Spohn 
[20, 21]. 
Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs is finding increasing 
acceptance in artificial intelligence since it is viewed 
as a qualitative counterpart of Bayesian probability 
theory. Spohn's theory is also referred to as "kappa 
calculus." It has its roots in Adams's [1] work on the 
logic of conditionals, and has been studied extensively 
by Goldszmidt and Pearl [10, 11] who refer to it as 
"rank-based system" and "qualitative probabilities." 
The main representation function in Spohn's calculus 
is called a disbelief function and its values can be in­
terpreted as infinitesimal or order of magnitude prob­
abilities. Spohn's calculus includes conditional dis­
belief functions and a notion of conditional indepen­
dence that satisfies the graphoid axioms [12]. This 
means that the qualitative theory of (probabilistic) 
Bayesian networks based on conditional independence 
applies unchanged to Spohn's calculus. Furthermore 
the definitions of combination (pointwise addition [18]) 
and marginalization (minimization) in Spohn's calcu­
lus satisfies the axioms described by Shenoy and Shafer 
[19] that enable local computation. Thus the message­
passing architectures for computing marginals such as 
the Shenoy-Shafer architecture [19] and the Hugin ar­
chitecture [13] apply also to Spohn's calculus. 
One of the major attractions of Bayesian probability 
theory is a normative decision theory based on von 
Neumann and Morgenstern's and Savage's theories of 
rational decision making by maximizing expected util­
ity (or maximizing subjective expected utility in the 
case of Savage). The focus of this paper is to propose 
a qualitative linear utility theory for Spohn's calculus 
so that an analogous decision theory can be formulated 
for problems in which uncertainty is characterized by 
epistemic beliefs. We propose axioms analogous to the 
axioms proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(as described by Luce and Raiffa [14]) and describe 
a representation theorem that states that if the de­
cision makers preferences satisfy these axioms, then 
there exists a unique qualitative linear utility function 
such that the utility of any Spohnian lottery is equal 
to the "expected" utility of the lottery. 
An outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. 
In Section 2, we briefly describe Spohn's epistemic be­
lief calculus. In Section 3, we define Spohnian lotter­
ies, qualitative utility function, state the axioms, and 
state and prove the main result. We also describe a 
small example to illustrate the use of the linear utility 
function. In Section 4, we discuss the implications of 
the results and explain the significance of the results 
using probabilistic semantics of Spohn's calculus. In 
Section 5, we compare our findings with related re­
search on qualitative decision making theories. Finally 
in Section 6, we conclude with a summary and some 
concluding remarks. 
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2 Spohn's Theory of Epistemic Beliefs 
Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs [20, 21, 10] is an 
elegant, simple and powerful calculus designed to rep­
resent and reason with plain human beliefs. The mo­
tivation behind Spohn's theory is the need for (i) a 
formalism to represent plain epistemic beliefs and ( ii) 
procedures for revising beliefs when new information 
is obtained. 
The main ingredients of Spohn's theory are (i) a func­
tional representation of an epistemic state called a dis­
belief function, and ( ii) a rule for revising this function 
in light of new information. Like a probability dis­
tribution function, a disbelief function for a variable 
is completely specified by its values for the singleton 
subsets of configurations of the variable. 
Formally, let 0 denote a set of possible worlds. We as­
sume n is finite, IOI = m. We use w (with subscripts) 
to denote a world, i.e. w E 0. If we are interested in a 
finite set of variables {X 1, X 2, . . .  , X n} each of those is 
also finite, 0 can be identified with Cartesian product 
xfOx; where Ox denotes the set of possible values of 
X. Thus, each world w E 0 is identified with a tu­
ple of values (x1, X2, ... , Xn) where Xi is a value of Xi. 
We also use notation w(i) to denote value of variable 
Xi in the world W and Xi = X to denote the subset 
{ w E Ol w( i) = X} of n. 
A Spohnian disbelief function t5 for 0 is defined as a 
mapping 
t5 : 211 _____. z+ u { oo} 
where z+ is set of non-negative integers, satisfying the 
following axioms: 
S1 
and 
S2 
min t5 ( { w}) = 0 
wEll 
t5(A) = { :;nwEA t5(w) if 0 =1 A� n i f  A= 0 
As a result of Axiom (S2), a disbelief function is com­
pletely determined by its values for singletons. Thus 
for computational reasons, we can represent a disbelief 
function by a disbelief potential {j : n ----> z+ u { 00 }. 
For A � 0 such that t5(A) < oo, the conditional dis­
belief function 6( .lA) is defined as 
S3 t5(BIA) = t5(B n A) - 8(A). 
It is easy to verify that t5(.1A) is a disbelief function, 
i.e., it satisfies 81 and 82. 
The notion of independence for Spohn's epistemic be­
lief is defined similar to that of probability. A and B 
are independent events if t5(A n B) = t5(A) + t5(B). Or 
in terms of variable we say that Xi and X1 are inde­
pendent if t5(Xi =a, X1 = b) = t5(Xi =a)+ t5(Xj =b) 
where a, b are arbitrary values of Xi, X1 respectively. 
It is easy to note that axioms 81 through S3 which 
describe the static and dynamic aspects of modeling 
uncertainty have a similar role to that of Kolmogorov's 
axioms and Bayes's rule in probability. 
To define the semantics of disbelief functions, we will 
define a related function called a Spohnian belief func­
tion. Given disbelief function t5, we can define a Spoh­
nian belief function (3 : 211 ----> Z U { -oo, oo} (where Z 
is the set of all integers) as follows [18] : 
{ -t5(A) 
f3(A) = t5(Ac) 
if t5(A) > 0 
if t5(A) = 0 (1) 
where Ac is the complement of A in 0. (3(A) = m, 
where m > 0, means proposition A is believed to degree 
m. (3(A) = m, where m < 0, means proposition A is 
disbelieved to degree m. (3(A) = 0 means proposition 
A is neither believed nor disbelieved. (3(A) = oo means 
proposition A is believed with certainty. And (3(A) = 
-oo means proposition A is disbelieved with certainty. 
3 Spohnian Lotteries and Their 
Utilities 
Following Luce and Raiffa [14], we use the term Spoh­
nian lottery to denote a lottery in which uncertainty 
is modeled by a Spohnian disbelief function. Let 
0 = { o1, 02, ... , Or} denote a finite set of prizes in­
volved in a lottery. We assume, without loss of gen­
erality, a strict preference order over the set of prizes 
o1 >- 02 >- . . . >- Or where >- reads "is qualitatively 
preferred to". So there are no two equally preferred 
prizes in 0. 01 is the best prize, and Or is the worst. 
A simple Spohnian lottery is a pair of a prize vector 
and a vector representing a Spohnian disbelief poten­
tial. We write it in the form ( 0.6) where 0 is the 
prize vector ( 01, 02, ... , Or) and t5 = ( 61> 62, ... , 8r) is a 
Spohnian disbelief potential vector, i.e., t5i E z+u{oo} 
and 
Sometimes [o1.61, 02.62, . .. , Or .t5r] is used to denote a 
lottery. And because the set of prizes is fixed, a simple 
lottery can be identified with just a disbelief vector 
( 61, 62, ... , t5r). We use the convention that a prize is a 
simple lottery in which the disbelief degree associated 
with the prize is zero and others are infinity. This leads 
us to the concept of compound or multi-stage lotteries 
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Figure 1: A lottery tree of depth 2. 
in which the prizes are again lotteries. We use L to 
denote the set of all lotteries, simple or compound. 
Graphically, a lottery is a rooted tree whose leaves are 
prizes and associated with branches outgoing from a 
node is a (conditional) disbelief function. So we can 
define a lottery's depth as the depth of the correspond­
ing tree. For example, a prize is a lottery of depth 
0, a simple lottery has depth 1, and so on. In Fig­
ure 1, a graphical representation of a lottery of depth 
2, [ [o1.4, o2.0, o3.0].0, [o1.0, o3.2].5], is shown. 
A standard lottery is one that realizes in either the 
most preferred prize o1 or the least preferred prize Or, 
i.e., [o1.h:l, Or.Kr ] · Of course, condition min(h:I, K2) = 
0 must also be satisfied. We use S to denote the set of 
all standard lotteries. 
Since our task is to compare lotteries, we will study a 
complete and transitive relation1 :=::: on the set L. No­
tice that :=::: denotes a qualitative preference relation on 
L, i.e., £1 :=::: £2 means £1 is "approximately preferred 
or indifferent to" L2. This preference relation will be 
represented by what we call a "qualitative utility func­
tion." To enable this representation, we assume that 
the preference relation satisfies some desirable proper­
ties. Formally, we will adopt axioms similar to those 
presented in Luce and Raiffa [14]. 
Axiom 1 (Ordering of prizes) The prefer-ence r-e­
lation >- over the set of pr-izes 0 is complete and tran­
sitive. 
This axiom simply formalizes our assumption about 
the set of prizes. 
Axiom 2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) 
Any compound lottery is indifferent to a simple 
lottery whose disbelief degrees are calculated ac­
cording to Spohn's calculus. A compound lot-
1 Derivative relations >- and "' are defined from ::: as 
usual, i.e., a>- b means a::: band bIt a, and a"' b means 
a::: band b::: a. 
tery Lc [Ll.bl,L2.b2,···,Lk.bk] where L; 
[ol.h:il, 02 .h:;2, ... , Or .K;r ] for 1 � i � k is indifferent to 
the simple lottery Ls = [o1.K1, o2.K,2, ... , Or.Kr ] where 
(2) 
The intuition behind this axiom is as follows. The 
compound lottery Lc can be interpreted as two stage 
process. The outcomes possible for the first stage are 
x1, x2, ... , .'Ek. If x; realizes, the lottery player gets 
simple lottery L; which in turn has set of outcomes 
Yl, Y2, .. . , Yr· If YJ realizes, the player is rewarded with 
o1 . Another way to view Lc is by collapsing the two 
stages together to obtain a lottery with the set of pos­
sible outcomes {(x;y1)11 � i � k and 1 � j � r}. 
When a (*YJ) is realizes (wildcard * can match with 
any x), the player is rewarded with prize o1 . So the 
degree of disbelief the player associates with getting 
prize o1 is disbelief degree he assigns to set *YJ. As per 
Spohn's calculus, the disbelief degree associated with 
combined state X;YJ is calculated by b; + h:ij· Hence, 
disbelief degree assigned to set *YJ is min{ Dj + h:ij 11 � 
i � k}. 
Axiom 3 (Substitutability) 
Indifferent lotteries are substitutable. That is 
if L; L� then [L1.b1, ... ,L;.b; ... ,Lk.bk] 
[£1.61, ... , L�.b;, ... , Lk.bk]· 
This requirement is the same as presented in Luce and 
Raiffa and it conveys the idea that preference relation 
reflects the desirability of a lottery and that desirabil­
ity is not context sensitive. 
Axiom 4 (Quasi-continuity) For each prize o;, 
there exists a standard lottery that is indifferent to it. 
In particular, we assume 01 '"" [o1.0, Or . oo] and Or '"" 
[o1.oo, Or.O]. This is reasonable since in [o1.0, Or . oo], we 
believe in o1 with certainty, and in [o1.oo, Or.OJ, we be­
lieve in Or with certainty. A comparison with the con­
tinuity assumption adopted for probabilistic case may 
give an impression that this assumption is too strong 
because set of standard (qualitative) lotteries does not 
constitute a continuum. We hold that it is quite rea­
sonable since :=::: should be read as "qualitatively pre­
ferred to". One can regard the set of standard lotteries 
as a fishing net that spreads from most preferred lot­
tery o1 to the least preferred one Or. Therefore, any 
lottery L is caught between a pair of successive knots, 
for example, between say [o1.0,or.k] and [o1.0,or.k+1]. 
So what this axiom entails is to disallow the ambiva­
lence and force a "qualitative indifference" between L 
and one of the two standard lotteries. 
Axiom 5 (Transitivity) Preference relation over 
the set of lotteries is complete and transitive. For-
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mally, for Li, Lj, Lk E L, either Li t Lj or Lj t Li; 
and if Li t Lj and Lj t Lk, then Li t Lk 
Axiom 6 (Qualitative monotonicity) The prefe'T'­
ence relation t over S satisfies the following condi­
tion. Suppose 8 = [o1.K1,or.Kr] and 81 = [o1.K�,or.K�] 
ar·e two standa'T'd lotteries then 
{ K1 = K� = 0 & Kr > K� (i) 
S )- S1 iff K1 = 0 & K� > 0 (ii) 
K1 < K� & K2 = K� = 0 (iii) 
(3) 
The intuition behind this axiom is as follows. In the 
first case (i) when K1 = K� = 0, we believe (using 
function (3 given in equation (1) ) o1 to degree Kr in 8 
and we believe o1 to degree K� in 81• Since Kr > K� one 
should prefer s to 81• In the second case, we believe 
o1 (to degree Kr) in 8 and we believe in Or (to degree 
K�) in 81. Again, one should prefer 8 to s' (regardless 
of the values of Kr and K�). In the third case (iii), 
we believe Or to degree K1 in s, and we believe Or to 
degree K� in s'. Since K1 < K�, one should prefer 8 
to 81• Thus, on the set of standard lotteries S there 
is a well defined (complete and transitive) preference 
relation. 
We have the following lemma that states that the set of 
Spohnian lotteries divided by the indifference relation 
is isomorphic to the set of standard lotteries. 
Lemma 1 If the prefe'T'ence 'T'elation t on the set of 
lotteries L satisfies axioms 1 though 6, then fo'T' each 
lottery there exists one and only one standa'T'd lottery 
indifferent to it. 
Proof: We prove the existence of indifferent standard 
lottery by induction on the depth of lottery trees. 
For a constant lottery (of depth 0), because of axiom 
4, each prize oi is indifferent to a standard lottery 8i. 
A lottery of depth 1 is either a standard lottery 
or a simple lottery. Obviously, a standard lot­
tery is indifferent to itself. For a simple lot­
tery L = [o1.b1,o2.b2, ... , or.brJ, by axiom 3, L "' 
[s1.b1,82.b2, ···, 8r.br]· By axiom 2, the latter 
can be reduced to a standard lottery s such that 
[81.61, 82. 621 • • •  1 8r.br] "' 8. 
Suppose for all lotteries of depth not greater than n, 
there is a standard lottery indifferent to it. 
For a lottery L of depth n + 1. This lottery is a com­
pound lottery whose prizes are lotteries of depth not 
greater than n. Because of induction hypothesis, each 
prize of L is indifferent to a standard lottery. By sub­
stitutability, L is indifferent to a compound lottery of 
depth 2. Again by induction hypothesis, there is a 
standard lottery indifferent to it. 
(0, =) 
(0,0) ( = ,  0) 
Figure 2: The space B0 depicted by dots. 
Finally, we have to show that there is only one stan­
dard lottery indifferent to a given lottery. Suppose 
there are two standard lotteries s1, 82 E S such that 
s1 "' Land 82 "' L. By axiom 5, we have 81 "' s2. But 
by axiom 6, it is possible only if 81 = 82. • 
From a decision theoretic perspective, we would like to 
model a preference relation t on the set of all lotteries 
L by a utility function u : L ___, Z U { -=, =} such 
that given any two lotteries Land £', u(L) � u(L') if 
and only if L t L'. Clearly, this implies that u(L) = 
u(L') whenever L"' L'. Notice that unlike traditional 
quantitative utility function which has range in the 
real line, the function u has value in a discrete set 
which in this ca<;e is the set of integers and the labels 
-= and =· From Lemma 1, it is clear that if we find 
a way to assign utility values to standard lotteries then 
it is straightforward to do so for any lottery. 
Next we define an utility function for standard lotter­
ies. We abbreviate 8 = [o1.K1, Or.Kr] by a pair (K:1, K:r)· 
From the qualitative monotonicity axiom, it is clear 
that the following function will satisfy the definition 
of a qualitative utility function above: 
(4) 
For maintaining the analogy with the case of proba­
bilistic lotteries, we will define a utility function as a 
function U : L ___, B0 where B0 is defined as follows: 
Bo �f 
{(x ,y) lx ,y E z+ U {=} s.t. min(x,y) = 0} 
Even though B0 is a subset of (z+ U {=}) x (z+ U 
{ =}) , we can define a complete and transitive order 
� on the set Bo as follows: ( x 1, yi) � ( x2, Y2) if and 
only if Y1 - .-:r1 � Y2 - x2. Alternatively, notice that 
Equation 4 establishes an isomorphism between Bo 
and ZU { -=, = }. Therefore, B0 inherits all the order 
relations of ZU{ -=, = }. Thus a function U: L ___, Bo 
is a qualitative utility function if U ( L) � U ( L') iff 
L tL'. 
Since B0 is a set of binary vectors, addition of a scalar, 
and pointwise minimization are defined as usual. Sup­
pose c E z+, b = (x,y) and hi= (xi,Yi) 
C + b def ( ) x + c,y + c ( 5) 
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def (min {xi}, min {yi}) t t (6) 
Next, we state and prove a "qualitative linear utility" 
representation theorem that is analogous to the repre­
sentation theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern. 
Theorem 1 Suppose we are given a preference rela­
tion C:: on the set of all lotteries L that satisfies Ax­
ioms 1 to 6. There exists a qualitative utility function 
U : L __, B0 such that 
U([£1.81, £2.82, ... , Lk.8k] )  = min {8i + U(Li)} 1S::i:Sk 
(7) 
Futhermore, such a qualitative utility function is 
unique. 
Proof: First we prove the existence of a qualitative 
utility function U : L __, B0 by constructing it as 
follows. For standard lotteries, U is defined as follows: 
(8) 
For an arbitrary lottery L, we define U(L) U(s) 
where sis the standard lottery that is indifferent to L. 
By Lemma 1, each lottery L is indifferent to exactly 
one standard lottery s. Therefore the function U is a 
well-defined qualitative utility function. 
Next, we will show that U as constructed above sat­
isfies Equation 7. Consider depth-one lottery L = 
[o1.81, 02.82, ... , Or.8r]· By Axiom 4, each prize Oi is in­
different to a standard lottery, say Si = [o1.��:il, Or .ll:ir ]. 
Therefore, U(oi) = (��:i1, ��:ir)· Consider lottery L' = 
[s1.81, 82.82, ... , Sr.8r]· From Axiom 3, L rv L'. By 
Axiom 2, L' is indifferent to the standard lottery 
s = [01.11:1, Or.ll:r] where 
Therefore U(L) = U(L') = U(s) = (��:1, ��:r). Finally 
we notice that 
min { 8i + (��:il, ll:ir)} 1:St:Sr 
min { ( 8i + ��:il, 8i + ll:ir)} 1:St:Sr 
( min {8i + ��:ii}, min {8i + ll:ir}) 1:Si:Sr 1:Si:Sr 
(11:1' ll:r) 
Therefore U(L) = min1:::;i:::; r {8i + U(oi)}. By induc­
tion on the lottery's depth, we can prove this property 
for any general lottery. 
The proof of the fact that U defined above is the 
only qualitative utility function satisfying Equation 7 
breaks down into several small steps. Let u be an­
other qualitative utility function from L to Bo satis­
fying Equation 7. 
First, we will show that u has value in both "half 
lines" {(0, y)} and {(x, 0)}. Suppose to the contrary, 
u(L) :2: (0, h) for all L E L. Let us denote stan­
dard lottery [o1.a, or.b] by s{a,b}· Let u(s{o,o}) = (O, k) 
and u(s{m,o}) = (0, k'). Because s{o,o} >- s{m,O}> and 
u is utility function, we have k > k'. Consider lot­
tery [s{o,o} .0, S{m,O} . 0] . We have [s{o,O} .0, S{m,O} .0] rv 
s{o,O}· Since u is a qualitative utility function 
u([s{o,O}·O, s{m,O}·O]) = u(s{o,o}) = (0, k). On the 
other hand, applying the formula in the right-hand 
side of Equation 7, we have u([s{o,o} .0, s{m,O} .0]) = 
min{(O, k), (0, k')} = (0, k') leading to a contradiction. 
Therefore u has values in both half lines of B0. 
We will now show that u(s{o,o}) = (0, 0). Suppose to 
the contrary u(s{o,o}) = (0, k) with k > 0. From the 
previous step, we can assume there are lotteries s1, s2 
such that u(si) = (0, k) and u(s2) = (h, 0). By con­
sidering lotteries of the form [s1.0, s2.8] or [s1.8, s2.0] , 
using the right-hand side of Equation 7, we see that 
points (0, 8) and (8, 0) with 8 :S min{k, h} represent 
values of u for some lotteries. In particular there is 
a standard lottery s such that u(s) = (0, 0). Since 
u(s{o,o}) = (0, k) > (0, 0) = u(s), s must have the 
form s{m,O} for some m > 0 i.e. u(s{m,o}) = (0, 0). 
Consider again the lottery [s{o,O}·O, s{m,O}·O]. We have 
[s{o,o} .0, S{m,O} .OJ rv 8{0,0}. So, u([s{o,o} .0, S{m,O} .0]) = 
u( s{o,o}) = (0, k). On the other hand, applying the for­
mula in the right-hand side of Equation 7, we have 
u([s{o,O}·O,s{m,O}·O]) = min{(O, k), (O, O)} = (0, 0) 
leading to a contradiction. Therefore u( s{o,o}) = 
(0, 0). 
We can use the Dirichlet principle to show that 
u(s{o,m}) = (O,m). Suppose u(s{o,m}) = (O , n). Con­
sider case n < m. Since s{o,m} >- s{o,m-1} >- . .. >­
s{o,o}, we have m + 1 different lotteries but only n + 1 
slots for utility values from (0, 0) to (0, n). Thus, two 
lotteries one of which is strictly preferred to the other, 
must be given the same value by u leading to a contra­
diction. In case n > m, consider lotteries of the form 
[s{o,o} .8, s{o,m} . 0] where 8 :S n. Applying the right­
hand side of Equation 7 for them, we see that every 
of n + 1 slots from (0, 0) to (0, n) must be filled by a 
lottery in L. Using Lemma 1 these slots must be filled 
by standard lotteries. But between s{o,o} to s{o,m}, 
there are only m + 1 standard lotteries again leading 
to a contradiction. 
Thus, if u is a qualitative utility function satisfying 
equation 7 then u = U. In other words, U is unique. 
• 
Figure 3 illustrates the calculation of expected utility 
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(1, 0) 
o1 (0, oo) 
03 (oo,O) 
01 (0, oo) 
03 (oo, 0) 
Figure 3: Expected utility of a lottery. 
of the lottery in Figure 1 if we assume 02 ,....., [o1.0, 03.3] 
and o1 is the best prize and o3 is the worst prize. 
Notice that when L is a simple lottery, Equation 7 can 
be rewritten as 
which is structurally similar to von Neumann - Mor­
genstern's expected utility formula. Multiplication in 
probability is replaced by addition in Spohn's theory. 
And addition in probability theory is replaced by min­
imization in Spohn's theory. Therefore, we refer to 
the right hand side of Equation 7 as "qualitative ex­
pected utility." We have used B0 as a scale for mea­
suring preferences. However, this is done only to show 
that the form of the utility function in Equation 7 is 
analogous to the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for 
probabilistic lotteries. Using Equation 4, we can use 
Z U { -oo, oo} as the scale of the utility function. 
One difference between qualitative and quantitative 
lotteries should be noted. While quantitative util­
ity uses a continuous scale (real numbers), qualitative 
utility use a discrete scale. So one should not expect 
a smooth gradation in utility for qualitative lotteries 
as is the case for probabilistic lotteries. For example, 
consider two prizes o; >- oi+1 that are successive in the 
sense that there is no other prize in between them i.e. 
there is no OJ such that o; >- Dj >- oi+1. Consider a lot­
tery of the form [o;.8;, o;+1.8i+1] where min(8;, 8i+I) = 
0 and 6;, 8i+1 < oo. Intuition from quantitative utility 
would suggest U(o;) > U([o;.O;, Oi+1·8i+1]) > U(oi+d· 
However, the following exam pic shows that this rela­
tionship does not always hold in the case of qualitative 
utility. Let us assume U(o;) = (0, ��:+a) and U(oi+I) = 
(0, ��:) . In the case 8i+1 > 8; = 0, by Theorem 1, 
U([o;.O, oi+1.8i+1]) = min{U(o;), 8i+l + U(oi+l)} = 
(O, min{K: + a,��: + 8i+1}. If we further assume that 
a:::; 8;+1 then U([o;.O, oi+1.8;+1]) = (0, ��:+a) = U(o;). 
Thus the qualitative utility scale is unable to always 
make fine distinctions that the probabilistic utility the­
ory can make. 
Example: Building Houses in an Earthquake Zone. 
Outcomes. Houses that can survive an earthquake of 
intensity k where 0 :::; k :::; 12 are measured in Mercalli 
Intensity Scale2, which ranks earthquakes in terms of 
magnitude of destruction they cause for structures: 
qo,ql, ... ,ql2· 
Qualitative Utility of an Earthquake-Proof Res­
idence. Let us consider the following hypothetical 
situation. A person is planning to build her house 
in a earthquake-prone region. When the homeowner 
considers what earthquake intensity her house should 
withstand, she may not be able to relate a certain in­
tensity, say q5, with an uncertain situation involving 
only no earthquake (q0) and the most intense earth­
quake (q12). However, in terms of financial cost, ob­
viously the higher the earthquake intensity a house 
can survive the costlier it is. So, the homeowner will 
definitely prefer q0 >- q1 >- ... >- q12. We can as­
sociate an earthquake of intensity k with a pair of 
numbers ( ak, bk) as follows. The damage caused by 
earthquakes can range from no perceptible damage to 
complete destruction. Thus we set o1 as no damage 
and Or as complete destruction. For each earthquake 
intensity, we find an equally preferred standard lottery 
and denote the disbelief function by (ak, bk) · An ex­
ample of one set of such assessments is shown in Table 
below. One interpretation of the assessments is that 
the damage caused by earthquakes of intensity up to 
2 is viewed as "acceptable" since they are all equally 
preferred to standard lotteries where the homeowner 
believes the outcome is no damage (to different de­
grees, of course), and damage caused by earthquakes 
of intensity 4 or more are "unacceptable" since they 
are all equally preferred to standard lotteries where 
the homeowner believes the outcome is complete de­
struction (to different degrees). The damage caused 
by intensity 3 earthquake lies between these two cate­
gories. 
Given that "scientists have never predicted a major 
earthquake, nor do they know how or expect to know 
how any time in the foreseeable future" (The United 
States Geological Surveys' web site), it seems there is 
not sufficient information to produce a probability dis­
tribution of earthquakes in a certain region. However, 
the subjective epistemic belief about EQ occurrence 
2Level 0 represents no earthquake. A level 1-5 on the 
Mercalli scale would represent a small amount of observable 
damage. For example, at this level doors would rattle, 
dishes break and weak or poor plaster would crack. As 
the level rises toward the larger numbers, the amount of 
damage increases considerably. The number 12 represents 
total damage. List of 1-12 levels of the Modified Mercalli 
Intensity Scale of 1931 (Abridged; Wood and Neumann, 
1931). See Earthquakes & Volcanoes, v. 25, no. 2, 1994, 
p. 87 for more details. 
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may be represented in the form of a Spohnian epis­
temic disbelief function 60,61, ... , 612, i.e., the home­
owner believes (to degree 1) that an earthquake of in­
tensity 4 will occur during her ownership of her new 
home. 
The above situation can be seen to satisfy the axioms 
of qualitative utility. Therefore, we can estimate "ex­
pected utility" of the situation. 
U([qo.6a, ... ,q12·612])= min {6i+U(qi)} (10) o:::;i92 
Suppose the information is given in the following table 
EQ Intensity 
Utility 
assessment 
6i 
6 9 
0 0 
2 3 
qo 
0 
CXJ 
4 
q1 q2 q3 
0 0 0 
7 2 0 
3 2 1 
11 14 18 
0 0 0 
4 5 6 
q4 
2 
0 
0 
21 
0 
7 
q5 q6 
3 4 
0 0 
1 2 
The calculation of qualitative expected utility of the 
situation results in (1, 0). That ranks the given un­
certain situation in between earthquakes of intensity 3 
and 4, i. e., slightly unacceptable. In other words, the 
prospective homeowner should build her home so that 
it can survive an earthquake of intensity 4. • 
4 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Utility 
So far, we have discussed essentially ordinal relation­
ship among qualitative lotteries. Thanks to the ordi­
nal semantics, the proposed qualitative utility theory 
is well suited for situations when quantitative assess­
ment of the strength of belief and/or the desirability of 
consequences is difficult. Various reasons contribute to 
that difficulty such as the nature of a problem, and the 
subjective ability of assessors, or the cost of doing an 
assessment. In practice, ordinal information is often 
represented by numbers. Thus in practice, informa­
tion is rarely purely quantitative or purely qualitative, 
but somewhere in between. For example, by assum­
ing an objective probability distribution for prizes of 
lotteries, utility theory in probabilistic lottery frame­
work considered by von Neumann and Morgenstern is 
quantitative. But when the theory is applied in prac­
tice, often, the required probability distribution is ob­
tained through some conversion of subjective opinions 
or sparse statistical data. In that sense, the applica­
tion of the theory is somewhat qualitative. 
For the qualitative utility theory based on Spohn 
epistemic belief developed here, the question we ad­
dress in this section is how can quantitative informa­
tion be used when it is available. It is well known 
that one interpretation of Spohnian disbelief degree is 
the order-of-magnitude approximation of probabilities 
[20, 21, 10, 5, 23, 11]. The idea is to express probability 
as a polynomial function of some E > 1 
n 
P,(w) = L:: ai * E-i 
i;:::o 
(11) 
where 0 :::; ai < E. That is, 0 · aoa1 ... an is a numeri­
cal representation of P (w) in the E-base system. Then 
the degree of disbelief is the absolute value of the or­
der of the polynomial which is the smallest index with 
strictly positive coefficient. Note that since P,(w) :::; 1 
and E > 1, the order of P, is non-positive. The same 
result can be obtained though a logarithmic transfor­
mation K(w) = l-log,(P(w) )J. Suppose E = 10, for 
example, .325 = 3 * c1 + 2 * c2 + 5 * c3. Thus, the 
degree of disbelief associated with a probability in the 
interval [.1, 1] is 0. When probability is in [.01, .1) dis­
belief degree is 1, and so on. In other words, we have 
the following rule: the degree of disbelief is the num­
ber of leading zeros in the E-based representation of 
a probability. 
Thus, Spohn's calculus can be interpreted in the light 
of manipulation of orders of probability polynomials. 
The order of sum of two polynomials equals the max­
imum of the two orders. And the order of product of 
two polynomials is the sum of the two orders. 
The idea of representing a number as a polyno­
mial function can also shed some light on the ex­
pected qualitative utility formula (7). Let us con­
sider a von Neumann-Morgenstern lottery L 
[p1.o1,P2·o2, ... ,pn.On] where Pi is the probability of 
winning prize o;. Assume o1 ?- o2 ?- . . .  On and also 
that utility of prizes is normalized i.e. u(o1) = 1 and 
u(on) = 0. The expected utility of the lottery u(L) is 
shown to be 
n 
u([p1.o1,P2·o2, ... ,pn.on]) = L Pi * u(o;) (12) 
i=1 
Now let us express p;, u(L) and u(o;) as polynomi­
als of some E > 1 i.e. Pi = Pi(E), u(L) = L(E) and 
u(o;) = Oi(E). We shall abuse notation slightly by 
considering K as operator that extracts the absolute 
value of the order of a polynomial i.e. K(P(E)) is the 
absolute value of order of P(E) . Now applying K oper­
ator on both sides of equation (12) with value replaced 
by corresponding polynomials we have 
n 
K(L(E)) = K(L P;(E) * O;(E)) (13) 
i=1 
By definition of K, the right hand side of (13) expands 
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to 
n 
So, 
K(L(E)) = min{K(Pi(E)) + K(Oi(E))}. (15) 
' 
Comparing (15) and (7), we see that the ex­
pected qualitative utility theorem is in agreement 
with (quantitative) expected utility theorem if we 
interpret disbelief degree and qualitative utility as 
order-of-magnitude abstraction of probability and von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility respectively. 
5 Related Work 
In the literature, Dubois and Prade [8, 9, 6] propose 
a qualitative decision theory based on possibility the­
ory. There are certain facts that make their proposal 
comparable to our study. First, there is a close rela­
tion between possibility theory and Spohn's epistemic 
belief theory as pointed out in [7]. The possibility of 
a proposition 1r(x) is related to the degree of disbe­
lief by the relation 1r(x) = exp( -8(x)), and vice versa. 
Second, Dubois and Prade base their proposal on von 
Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms as we do in this 
study. 
However, there are several important differences. 
First, the setting in [8] is to qualitatively compare be­
lief states given a fixed act where as the setting in our 
study is to compare acts given a fixed state of belief. 
The setting of [8] sometimes leads to a confusion about 
the intuition behind the preference relation on belief 
states. For example, Dubois and Prade's preference 
relation >:::.DP on the set of possibility distributions, by 
definition, is supposed to reflect comparison on util­
ity. However, their Axiom 3: If 1r :::; 7r1 then 1r >:::. 7r1 
("precision is safer") is imposed just by informational 
consideration. This axiom is contradicts our axiom 
6 ("qualitative monotonicity"). When proposing Ax­
iom 6, we have stated the rationale for adopting it. 
Let us consider an example. There are two situations, 
x denotes a loss of $1,000 and y denotes a gain of 
$1,000,000. Dubois-Prade's Axiom 3 would suggest 
that the loss of $1,000 with certainty has no less util­
ity than a lottery in which a loss of $1,000 and a gain 
of $1,000,000 are equally possible. However, according 
to our Axiom 6, the latter lottery is preferred to the 
former. 
Another difference between Dubois-Prade's and our 
proposals is in how compound lotteries are handled 
as summarized in their Axiom 5 and our Axiom 2. In 
our proposal, as in von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, 
the notion of independence between betting stages is 
exploited to derive the rule for reducing multi-stage 
lotteries. In Dubois-Prade's Axiom 5, just conser­
vative reasoning is invoked. We feel that incorpo­
rating independence information in the rule for ma­
nipulating compound lotteries, like in von Neumann­
Morgenstern's work, makes a decision theory more re­
alistic and practical than ignoring it. Although we 
are aware of problems and difficulties in justifying in­
dependence when all one has is information about ir­
relevance or lack of interaction, in practice people do 
perceive those notions interchangeably. In some situ­
ations, people may behave very cautiously, but they 
often rationally engage in risky business if the risk is 
reasonable for them. 
In [6], for a possibilistic lottery that is defined in a way 
similar to our lottery construction, there are two kinds 
of utilities called the "pessimistic" and "optimistic" 
utilities that are obtained by using two different sets 
of rules. Obviously, optimal decision depends on which 
utility is employed. In other words, there is informa­
tion about the meta-preference provided by users that 
is not covered within the formal systems proposed by 
the authors. In contrast, our utility theory doesn't 
make any assumption about the risk attitude of the 
decision maker as in the case of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's theory. This feature allows us to avoid 
the ambiguity a user faces when she wants to use pos­
sibilistic utility. 
However, it is important to note that in simple sit­
uations like the one in Savage's omelette example, a 
decision maker using a pessimistic utility function can 
be modeled as a user who follows our qualitative utility 
theory. 
An interesting line of work in qualitative decision have 
been pursued by Brafman and Tennenholtz [3, 4]. The 
authors adopt an axiomatic approach argued by Sav­
age [17] and characterize conditions under which an 
agent can be said as using maximin, minimax re­
gret, competitive ratios and maximax decision crite­
ria. They show that these very different criteria are 
equivalent in terms of representation power. In partic­
ular, the representation theorem for maximin rule says 
that if an agent's preference satisfies a property simi­
lar to Savage's sure thing principle and a transitive-like 
property then the agent's decision can be modeled by 
maximin rule. Purely qualitative rule such as maximin 
is justified because in their setting the consideration 
of chance or likelihood of possible worlds is ignored. 
In our setting, the notion of beliefs of possible worlds 
enters explicitly in decision making. It can be easily 
shown that preference based on the notion of expected 
qualitative utility we develop here cannot be modeled 
by a simple maximin rule. 
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Qualitative decision based on Spohn's calculus has also 
been studied by Pearl and his associates at UCLA 
[10, 16, 11, 22, 5, 2] and Wilson [23]. They show that 
a disbelief degree (ranking) can be viewed as order-of­
magnitude probabilities. A similar idea can be traced 
back to Adams [1] (see [15] for a discussion). These au­
thors successfully use the relationship between kappa 
rankings and probability to solve problems in non­
monotonic reasoning, for example, defining probabilis­
tic semantics for default rules and conditional ought 
statements. They provide various set of decision mak­
ing rules justified by semantics of non-standard prob­
ability. However, none of these studies approach the 
problem from an axiomatic point of view as we do in 
this paper. We conjecture that most of these results 
can be justified by using our qualitative utility func­
tion and some assumptions of the nature of the utility 
function. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
Our goal in this paper is to propose a utility theory 
for Spohnian lotteries in which the uncertainty of win­
ning different prizes is expressed by epistemic beliefs. 
The utility function obtained is qualitative in the sense 
that a discrete scale is used. Also, in the formula of 
expected utility, minimization and addition operations 
are used in place of addition and multiplication in the 
formula for quantitative expected utility. This seems 
to make sense for lotteries in which uncertainty is char­
acterized qualitatively by disbelief values. Method­
ologically, we adapt the construction of a linear utility 
function for the case of probabilistic lotteries to the 
case of Spohnian lotteries. We show that preference 
among Spohnian lotteries that is required to satisfy 
some plausible axioms can be represented by an anal­
ogous qualitative linear utility function. 
Decision making based on qualitative expected utility 
is somewhere in between purely qualitative rules such 
as maximin, minimax regret or maximax on one hand, 
and the purely quantitative rule of maximizing von 
Neumann-Morgenstern's expected utility on the other 
hand. Unlike, for example, the maximin rule which 
focuses on the worst possible outcome, our qualitative 
utility theory incorporates the epistemic beliefs about 
realization of all possible outcomes. However, qualita­
tive utility may be viewed as order-of-magnitude ap­
proximation of quantitative utility. We think that the 
position in the middle ground between the two camps 
is a good one. That avoids criticisms both camps make 
toward the other. For quantitative utility, a common 
critique is that it often demands more than realisti­
cally available assessments of uncertainty and prefer­
ences for standard lotteries. For decision rules such 
as maximin, the critique is that it is too conservative 
and often ignores information even when available. It 
is easy to find examples in which maximin rule leads 
to unrealistic choices. Although we do not claim that 
the earthquake example is a realistic one, it helps to 
illustrate our point. In order to calculate vNM utility, 
we arc suppose to have a probability distribution of 
earthquakes (despite the fact that earthquake special­
ists say that these are hard to come by) and we need 
to assess precise utilities for each of the earthquake in­
tensities. On the other hand, if the maximin rule were 
used, people would base their decisions on the effects 
of intensity 12 earthquake which is not realistic. Our 
qualitative utility theory demands assessments of un­
certainty in terms of epistemic beliefs and assessments 
of qualitative utilities for each of the earthquake in­
tensities, a reasonable middle ground between the two 
extremes. 
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